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There is obvious interest in gaining insights into the
epidemiology and evolution of the virus that has re-
cently emerged in humans as the cause of the coro-
navirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. The
recent paper by Forster et al. (1) analyzed 160 severe
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2)
full genomes available (https://www.gisaid.org/) in
early March 2020. The central claim is the identifica-
tion of three main SARS-CoV-2 types, named A, B, and
C, circulating in different proportions among Euro-
peans and Americans (types A and C) and East Asians
(type B). According to a median-joining network anal-
ysis, variant A is proposed to be the ancestral type
because it links to the sequence of a coronavirus from
bats, used as an outgroup to trace the ancestral origin
of the human strains. The authors further suggest that
the “ancestral Wuhan B-type virus is immunologically
or environmentally adapted to a large section of the
East Asian population, and may need to mutate to
overcome resistance outside East Asia.” There are
several serious flaws with their findings and interpre-
tation. First, and most obviously, the sequence iden-
tity between SARS-CoV-2 and the bat virus is only
96.2%, implying that these viral genomes (which are
nearly 30,000 nucleotides long) differ by more than
1,000 mutations. Such a distant outgroup is unlikely
to provide a reliable root for the network. Yet,
strangely, the branch to the bat virus, in figure 1 of
their paper, is only 16 or 17 mutations in length. In-
deed, the network seems to be misrooted, because
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(see their SI Appendix, figure S4) a virus from Wuhan from week
0 (24 December 2019) is portrayed as a descendant of a clade of
viruses collected in weeks 1 to 9 (presumably from many places
outside China), which makes no evolutionary (2) or epidemiolog-
ical sense (3).
As for the finding of three main SARS-CoV-2 types, we must
underline that finding different lineages in different countries and
regions is expected with any RNA virus experiencing founder
effects (2). According to Forster et al.’s (1) own analysis, a single
synonymous mutation (nucleotide change in a gene that does not
result in a modified protein) distinguishes type A from type B,
while one nonsynonymous mutation (resulting in a protein with
a single amino acid change) separates types A and C, and another
one separates types B and C. Given SARS-CoV-2’s fast evolu-
tionary rate, random emergence of new mutations is entirely
expected, even in a relatively short timeframe (4). When a viral
strain is introduced and spreads in a new population, such ran-
dom mutations can be propagated without them being se-
lected or advantageous, due to founder effects. The fact that
SARS-CoV-2 sequences show some geographical clustering is
not new and is nicely and interactively shown on Nextstrain (5),
but this cannot be used as a proof of biological differences
unless backed by solid experimental data (6). This is particularly
true for the work of Forster et al., since their findings are based
on a nonrepresentative dataset of 160 genomes, with no sig-
nificant correlation between prevalence of confirmed cases and
number of sequenced strains per country (7, 8). The essential
role of representative sampling is well documented in the liter-
ature (9), but was not acknowledged by the authors, who, in-
stead, claim that their “network faithfully traces routes of
infections for documented [COVID-19] cases,” without taking
into consideration missing viral diversity, or evaluating multiple
transmission hypotheses that would be consistent with se-
quence data, or even providing any support on the robustness
of the branching pattern in their network. Ultimately, no firm
conclusion should be drawn without evaluating the probability
of alternative dissemination routes.
The inappropriate application and interpretation of phyloge-
netic methods to analyze limited and unevenly sampled datasets
begs for restraint about origin, directionality, and early clade/
lineage inference of SARS-CoV-2. We feel the urgency to reframe
the current debate in more rigorous scientific terms, given the
dangerous implications of misunderstanding the true dispersal
dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 and the COVID-19 pandemic.
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